Abstract. This paper broadly covers key events and activities from which the Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) evolved. The NCSP maintains fundamental infrastructure that supports operational criticality safety programs. This infrastructure includes continued development and maintenance of key calculational tools, differential and integral data measurements, benchmark compilation, development of training resources, hands-on training, and web-based systems to enhance information preservation and dissemination.
INTRODUCTION
The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is an independent Federal agency that was established by Congress in 1988. Its mandate under the Atomic Energy Act is to provide safety oversight of the nuclear weapons complex operated by the Department of Energy (DOE). During the 1990s the DNFSB issued two formal recommendations to the Secretary of Energy regarding criticality safety. In response to these recommendations, DOE initiated activities that evolved into the current Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP). The NCSP maintains fundamental infrastructure that supports operational criticality safety programs. This infrastructure includes continued development and maintenance of key calculational tools, differential and integral data measurements, benchmark compilation, development of training resources, hands-on training, and web-based systems to enhance information preservation and dissemination. This paper broadly covers key events and activities from which the NCSP evolved.
NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE IN THE EARLY 1990s
In the early 1990s, dramatic changes in the global political landscape led to increasing uncertainty in DOE nuclear weapons program requirements. This uncertainty was exacerbated by the desire to reap a "peace dividend" and all programs were carefully scrutinized to determine their utility given the geopolitical situation. A program's priority was directly proportional to the strength of its link to the core weapons program. Programs with direct ties were given the highest priority. Cross-cutting activities with indirect links to the weapons program like those that comprise criticality safety infrastructure were relegated to lower priority and suffered from ever declining funding. Such was the case at the Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility (LACEF). A combination of the cessation of underground nuclear testing and associated debate over the future of the stockpile, ever increasing costs associated with the operation of LACEF, and the lack of a clear program sponsor led DOE to consider closing LACEF. Similar considerations had already resulted in the closure of all other critical mass laboratories within the DOE Complex. By 1993, LACEF was the only remaining critical mass laboratory capable of conducting general-purpose critical experiments with a wide range of special nuclear materials. lines satisfying the objectives of improving the information base underlying prediction of criticality, and serving in education of the community of criticality engineers." 3. "The results and resources of the criticality program should be used in ongoing departmental programs where nuclear criticality would be an important concern." In response to Recommendation 93-2, the Department established the Nuclear Criticality Experiments Steering Committee (NCESC) to "ensure the adequacy of the Department's criticality functional capability and experiments program including the commitment of resources to support these endeavors [2] ." In addition, two subcommittees (the Methodology and Experiments and Training Subcommittees) were established to advise the NCESC on technical matters. The NCESC reported to the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs and consisted of representatives from DOE offices with criticality safety responsibilities, field offices, and DOE offices with policy and oversight responsibilities. The goals [2] of the NCESC were: 1. To "provide a set of well documented critical experiments to confirm the adequacy of criticality computer codes and data." 2. To "maintain the Department's core competency with the performance of critical experiments." 3. To "improve nuclear criticality predictability."
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILIES
Initially, NCESC discussions were focused on reaching a consensus on the scope of the problem. The consensus was that preserving critical experiments and hands-on training at LACEF was necessary, but not sufficient. Even the DNFSB mused in the body of the recommendation that certain discrepancies between theoretical models and critical experiment results could not easily be explained and that it was not clear if such discrepancies were the result of inadequate nuclear data or inadequate care in conducting and documenting the experiments [1] . Clearly, other activities, like the capability to measure and evaluate differential nuclear data, maintenance of computer codes used to perform criticality safety calculations, and publication of benchmarks required preservation if nuclear criticality predictability was to be improved. Moreover, these activities needed to be well coordinated to achieve the level of efficiency necessary to continue the work within a severely constrained budget climate. To accomplish this, the NCESC developed the Nuclear Criticality Predictability Program (NCPP).
One person who was instrumental in shaping the scope of the Nuclear Criticality Predictability Program was Dr. Sol Pearlstein. At the time Recommendation 93-2 was issued, Dr. Pearlstein was serving as a consultant to the DNFSB and was responsible for monitoring the Department's progress in implementing the Recommendation. Because of his relationship with Dr. Herbert Kouts, DNFSB Member and principle author of Recommendation 97-2, and his long involvement in nuclear data activities at the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Dr. Pearlstein provided a unique perspective and helped educate members of the NCESC about the importance of differential data. The nuclear data element of the NCESC would not have received the priority it did had it not been for Dr. Pearlstein. His presence helped add appropriate balance to the Department's response to Recommendation 93-2 and establish a sound foundation upon which a viable criticality safety infrastructure could be built.
THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY PREDICTABILITY PROGRAM
After about a year of debate and substantial input from the technical subcommittees, the NCESC decided that the components of criticality safety infrastructure should be organized into a program and that funding for the NCPP should be shared by the DOE program offices that were responsible for operational criticality safety programs. Consequently, the NCPP was formally established in February 1995 and contained five program elements: Experiments, Training, Benchmarking, Analytical Codes, and Nuclear Data. Original budget projections from the DOE Annual Report on the Status of DNFSB Recommendation 93-2, dated September 1995, for the NCPP were $8.8 million for FY 1995 and $6 million for FY 1996 [3] . Obviously, the trend was problematic.
Throughout the remainder of 1995, 1996 and the early part of 1997, NCESC efforts were focused on convincing various DOE program offices to contribute funding. The basis for this effort was contained in an NCESC report entitled The Department of Energy Nuclear Criticality Predictability Program, dated January 17, 1996 [4]. This report recommended shared funding by the DOE Offices of Defense Programs (~$6.5 million); Environmental Management (~$3.5 million); Energy Research (~$800 thousand); Environment, Safety and Health (~$900 thousand); Nuclear Energy (~$120 thousand); and Human Resources (~$100 thousand) totaling about $12 million. On February 13, 1996, the Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Programs endorsed the NCESC recommendations contained in the report, officially transmitted it to the senior managers for each of the offices listed above, and requested that they review the report and agree to support the recommendations. This resulted in a series of briefings by the NCESC to the affected program offices, however little progress was made in securing any funding commitments.
Several other attempts were made to secure necessary funding for the NCPP. In August 1996, it was decided that a reasonable approach would be to develop a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between selected DOE Offices that would provide funding for the NCPP. A working group was formed and an MOA was drafted, but it was never signed. In the spring of 1997, Defense Programs decided to propose closure of Recommendation 93-2 and use the internal coordination process as a forcing function to get a Secretarial decision on shared funding levels. Prior to completion of this process, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 97-2 and DOE developed a resource loaded implementation plan that included support for activities initiated under Recommendation 93-2. Unfortunately, even this would prove to be an unacceptable forcing function to stabilize funding for the program because it was predicated upon shared funding among DOE offices that were experiencing significant budget pressure.
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILIES SAFETY BOARD RECOMMENDATION 97-2
On May 19, 1997, the DNFSB issued Recommendation 97-2, Criticality Safety. Recommendation 97-2 stated that although "DOE has made substantial progress in coordination and implementation of the criticality experiments program … a basic set of problems continues to exist throughout the DOE complex with regard to criticality control [5] ." These problems included qualification of criticality safety practitioners; the relationship between the criticality safety function, operations function, and line management at some sites; and the need to provide criticality safety data to support evolving DOE missions like clean-up operations and associated fissionable materials handling, packaging and transportation operations. The Recommendation contained the following nine Sub-Recommendations [5] "Collect and issue the experimental and theoretical data from the above in a publication as guidance for future activities." 5.
"Clarify in guidance that simple, bounding methods of analysis can be used in place of specific theoretical analysis in setting criticality limits for processes, and that limits derived in this manner are even preferable where they serve the purpose. The decreasing order of preference should be experimental data, theory benchmarked against experimental data, and non-benchmarked criticality analysis with an adequate safety margin." 6. "Develop and institute a short but intensive course of instruction in criticality and criticality safety at DOE's criticality experiments facility to serve as the foundation for a program of formal qualification of criticality engineers. This course should instill in students a familiarity with the factors contributing to criticality, the physical behavior of systems at and near criticality, and a theoretical understanding of neutron multiplication processes in critical and subcritical systems. A goal would be for reliance for criticality safety at any DOE facilities to rest in a group of individuals endowed with such experience." 7. "Where not already done, assign criticality safety as a staff function assisting line management, with safety responsibility residing in line management." 8. "Identify a core group of criticality experts experienced in the theoretical and experimental aspects of neutron chain reactions to advise on the above steps and assist in resolving future technical issues."
9. "Organize funding of the criticality research and instruction program to improve its stability and to recognize the cross cutting importance of this activity." The implementation plan for Recommendation 97-2, dated December 1, 1997 [6] , established the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program (NCSP) that subsumed all activities initiated under Recommendation 93-2 along with two additional program elements. In accepting the implementation plan, the DNFSB closed Recommendation 93-2.
The new activities initiated as a result of Recommendation 97-2 served to significantly enhance the criticality safety infrastructure supported by the old NCPP. These included the development of a new hands-on training course at LACEF to augment the existing five-day course; promulgation of training and qualification standards for Federal and contractor criticality safety practitioners; development of the Applicable Ranges of Bounding Curves and Data software; expansion of web based technology to disseminate criticality safety related information; and the formation of the Criticality Safety Support Group (CSSG). Although these initiatives proved to be extremely beneficial, creation of the CSSG was without a doubt the most significant. This group of recognized criticality safety experts included people with a substantial amount of operational criticality safety experience and as such was uniquely positioned to advise the Department on issues facing criticality safety practitioners on the floor in nuclear facilities. Along with filling a gap that existed in the old NCPP, the expertise resident in this group substantially broadened the scope of support that the criticality safety infrastructure could provide. Implementation of Recommendation 97-2 progressed rather smoothly with one exception. Subrecommendation 9 proved to be the most challenging to implement. A Nuclear Criticality Safety Program Management Team (NCSPMT) was formed to manage the NCSP. The NCSPMT was co-chaired by the Offices of Defense Programs and Environmental Management and consisted of representatives from the affected program offices. The NCSPMTs most important task was to establish a stable funding mechanism for the NCSP. Following over six months of negotiation and hard work, in August 1998, a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) [7] was signed by the Offices of Defense Programs; Environmental Management; Environment, Safety and Health; Energy Research; the Chief Financial Officer; and the Deputy Secretary. Commitments in the MOU were: Defense Programs (~$6 million); Environmental Management (~$3.5 million); Environment, Safety and Health ($220 thousand); and the Office of Energy Research agreed to maintain the Oak Ridge Electron Linear Accelerator in an operational state for differential cross section measurements. Unfortunately, for the next 3 years, significant effort was required to sustain the commitments and the MOU did not stabilize NCSP funding.
The DNFSB continued to express concern over funding stability and in a letter to the DNFSB on May 6, 2002, the Secretary announced that the Office of "Defense Programs has decided to fully fund and manage the Nuclear Criticality Safety Program for fiscal year 2003 and beyond [8] ." The NCSP funding has been stable ever since.
THE NUCLEAR CRITICALITY SAFETY PROGRAM [9]
The NCSP that exists today is very similar to the one that was initiated in response to Recommendation 97-2 with one major exception. The NCSPMT has been replaced by a single program manager from the Office of Defense Programs. The primary objective of the NCSP is to maintain fundamental infrastructure that supports operational criticality safety programs. This infrastructure includes key calculational tools, differential and integral data measurement capability, training resources, and web based systems to enhance information preservation and dissemination. Another important function of the NCSP is to solicit feedback from the operational criticality safety community so that the infrastructure remains responsive to evolving needs. The objective of operational nuclear criticality safety is to ensure that fissile material is handled in such a way that it remains subcritical under both normal and credible abnormal conditions to protect workers, the public, and the environment. A robust operational criticality safety program requires knowledgeable people and technical resources. The NCSP maintains these two key elements so the DOE can continue to do work safely with fissile materials. Team (CSCT), consisting of Federal Criticality Safety Practitioners at the sites, and the End Users Group (DOE Contractor Criticality Safety Practitioners) regarding DOE Field criticality safety issues. In 2002, a Nuclear Data Advisory Group (NDAG) was formed to advise the CSSG on data needs and prioritization of differential and integral data acquisition. The function of this important addition to the NCSP is described in a following paper by R. McKnight Each of these areas is interdependent on the others and together form a complete criticality safety infrastructure. If any of these program elements is eliminated, the ability of the Department's criticality safety engineers to perform their work will be substantially diminished. In addition to the seven technical program elements, two important facilities are required for successful execution of the NCSP: LACEF and the Oak Ridge Electron Linear Accelerator.
The NCSP is primarily a capability maintenance program aimed at preserving a unique skill set and associated infrastructural assets for the Nation. Skills and infrastructure are preserved and maintained by doing mission related work in each of the program elements. The results of this work significantly enhance criticality safety throughout DOE. In addition to maintaining the infrastructure or "base program", NCSP resources are routinely employed to solve DOE problems. The NCSP Manager coordinates such "program specific applications" and costs are recovered wherever appropriate.
